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I.
INTRODUCTION
COMES NOW, Jared D. Bristol, Defendant-Appellant in the above-entitled action,
representing himself, with this appellant brief in support of his appeal.

A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

This is a case of a challenge by the appellant to a local city ordinance Pocatello Municipal Code
(PMC) 8.24 regarding property maintenance requirements that a trial was held as an attempt to halt the
harassment by local officials, and appellant was asserting that this was a blatant attempt to criminalize
living conditions by forced living standards and an unconstitutional deprivation of rights. After the trial
where the defendant was found guilty, appellant was claiming that on appeal there was and unfair bias,
that there have been numerous violations of due process of law starting with the trial that these actions
were unconstitutional, the disregard of a takings claim, and also that the standard of review held by
district court was not objective and an attempt to avoid the issue.

B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case went to trial and with all the circumstances surrounding this trial Defendant was
found guilty, but Appellant holds that there had been many procedural defects, bias, questions of law,
and multiple due process violations more than likely for the purpose of containing the issue. Although
Defendant was hoping for good results during the trial to be heard and resolve, was also his intention if
necessary to follow up to further challenge these unjustifiable actions from this local ordinance for its
unconstitutional nature with a regulatory takings analysis, plus an appeal. All with the same results
either being ignored or dismissing the challenges by either avoiding the concern and not addressing it
or a beating around the bush type of dealings, not being objective. This appeal deals with the claim that
these are overreaching and conditionalizing actions of the local government attempting to criminalize
everyday commonplace activities and items arbitrarily, that these actions in relation to the local
ordinance are whimsical and foundationless as it is not consistent or in direct contradiction to both the
Statutes of Idaho and both the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions and the interpretation thereof, as it pertains
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to a major concern of the public interest and all individual rights. Over questions of law and
constitutional interpretations, the Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990).

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant reaffirms and restates his position as he had from the beginning as follows:

2)

2)

3)

The first basic issue that the Appellant will address and claims is that were violations of
due process of law.
a)

Appellant was denied and obstructed from substansive due process by abuse of
discretion by the court, as he held from the beginning challenges and questions
of law that these local government actions were unconstitutional.

b)

Appellant was denied due process during the course of the trial including bias
and arbitrary actions.

c)

Appellant was denied due process during a regulatory takings request that it was
ignored and deemed inapplicable during appeal even though was a separate
action but still involving this based on the basis of this case.

d)

Appellant was denied due process during the district court appeal, by not being
objective with avoidance actions not addressing the questions in the district court
appellant brief, using reasonings out of regulatory request that was a separate
action.

The next issue Appellant claims are the unconstitutional grounds and the violation of
rights.
a)

Local code enforcement officer did violate numerous rights in pursuit of this
ordinance and case, related to warrant-less searching, invasion of privacy, and
trespassing.

b)

This local ordinance PMC 8.24 and PMC 8.16 are not consistent and in conflict
with Idaho Statutes and Idaho and U.S. Constitutions.

Attorney fees are requested for the expenses and pursuit of resolve of undue hardship
caused thereby.

III.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Appellant does request attorney fees because of the unique nature of this case. As is has been
requested before by a Pro Se appellants. Although a great deal of this case expenses have been waived
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for pauper status, Appellant has still had expenses, done his own research and preparation, and
representing himself all the basic criteria of an attorney for attorney fees. In addition to the
circumstances of this case, should this Court strike down the ordinance, and determine that it be
unreasonable, arbitrary, and unconstitutional, then we are back to a takings claim, and the losses from
the deprivation of rights. If this Court deemed that aspect not addressable under the scope of this
inquiry and still determined the case in favor of Appellant, then at minimum basic attorney fees should
be awarded that Appellant may have the option of pursuing in a civil suit, with the option of the
assistance of an attorney that may be more desirable than self representation.

IV.
ARGUMENT
1.

SUBSTANSIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATED BYABUSE OF DISCRESSION BY THE COURT
Preliminarily, Appellant claims that in part that there was a violation of due process by an abuse
of discretion by the trial court. A pretrial was held on February 7r\ 2013 Tr. Vol. I, and the trial was
held on February 8th, 2013 Tr. Vol. II, and during the pretrial and the preliminary matters of the trial the
court abused its discretion in dismissing, deeming and banning the discussion of all of Appellants'
subject matter for his defense as 'civil in nature' because Appellant was claiming these actions
following the Pocatello Municipal Code (PMC) 8.24 was an unconstitutional deprivation of rights and
not a crime because its either one or the other it can't be both, so there was a question of law and
constitutional claim even before the start.
Now Appellant claims that this is no typical or standard case based on the subject matter.
Appellant assuredly made mistakes but attributes allot of it to the lack of fair and equal access to legal
information. Appellant reasons that as part of that complaint, that he'd been given the run-around by
courthouse employees or clerks that were seemingly not knowledgeable enough to lead Appellant in
the right direction as far as requisitioning local court rules and jury instructions, which is the same with
the local websites. So Appellant was left to his own devices which was certainly an explanation for the
jury instructions that were submitted, looking back on it now. Appellant did finally find all the proper
information on the proper Idaho website. Now appellant understands and understood that prose
litigants are held to the same standards which Appellant has made every effort, which of course also the
district court already addressed in his Memorandum Decision and Order, "R. Vol I. p. 191, L. 6". But
not being a standard or typical case the jury instructions still had some merit towards the questions of
law. It may be one thing to disregard the jury instructions that may have been more civil oriented but
that doesn't justify the eliminating the citations from the statutes and constitutions that were a
legitimate question of law to the arbitrary nature of the deprivation of rights from this local ordinance
and that its unsupported by the statutes and constitutions.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law. A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property interest at
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stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 69 ( 1972).
This action of excessive and inappropriate limiting is what determined the outcome of the trial
and in addition, effected and swayed the jury. Defendant asserts that this was the first violation of due
process as there was a property interest and liberties at stake. Appellant did not deem it necessary or
desirable to use the public defenders as they are rumored to be ineffective and only negotiate in
bartering a person a better deal in the deprivation and selling out their rights. It was the intention of the
Defendant to stand up and defend his rights to make such claims about this local ordinance that it is
arbitrary, been carried out arbitrarily, that it is inconsistent and in conflict with the statutes and
constitutions, that these were actions from an overreaching local government trying to criminalize
actions, activities and items of commonplace and everyday nature that the general populace does not
see or recognize as a crime, as they all partake, or this as a legitimate governmental action. And once
that was expressed the Defendant-Appellant would have requested motion for acquittal. Except the
course of the trial didn't go that way, Appellant didn't want to start with ineffective counsel, and the
court and the State exploited this opportunity to bias and prejudice against a Pro Se Appellant as a
skilled attorney would or may not have to be as concerned and be more effective in fighting court room
theatrics, which Appellant will go further into and expand explanation further later in this brief.

There are a number of problems and concerns that Appellant had with this trial, most if not all
were upheld by the court. Firstly the complaint R. Vol. I, p. 14-16, 23, 27-29, and even the Code
Enforcement officer testified Tr. Vol. II, L. 7, was a complaint from an anonymous complaint that
someone saw some vehicles, some trash, and that it was in a general state of disrepair, all regarding a
single day, November 7 th 2012. Appellant holds that it doesn't get any more ambiguous, speculative, or
arbitrary than that. Appellant claims that this is the most ridiculous claim and/or complaint from a local
government, that not only an anonymous complaint that sounds like it could have come from thin air,
but doesn't have any foundation, just that common property items had been seen, not that there is any
claim of injury or illegal content, and since when did these common property items turn into illegal
contraband, furthermore that this code enforcement officer could come by take pictures past "no
trespassing" signs(this will be elaborated on in the unconstitutional analysis) on a single day and charge
someone with a crime. This is very suspicious of having malicious intentions. This city might as well
take pictures on a property that someone is setting up a swing set for their kids with the cardboard box
on the ground, or if someone is moving in or out and has some items in boxes sitting on their porch and
charge them with a crime, because at that exact moment the code enforcement or representative takes
that picture then your guilty, is essentially what the local government of the City of Pocatello to the
State is implying. This is just an appearance ordinance, that any person who is caught in this trap is
arbitrarily charged with a crime, and being told that you didn't maintain your property, although
maintenance is defined as an ongoing process. This is a system setup for failure. Appellant has not
given the wrong impression about his intentions denying any invitation for the public to approach, and
there is no ambiguity from being fenced in yard area with "no trespassing", "private property", and "no
soliciting" signs. Also the code enforcement officer Mary T. Rasmussen testified to seeing a vehicle
that appeared to her to be inoperative but had the hood up and and was on jacks and later stated that
there was a hoist there, but that there were boxes and vehicle parts there as well Tr. Vol II. p. 42, L. 5.
Most common people would assume the vehicle is being maintained and that a space may have been
cleared out to do the work, and a following of a basic cleanup. This is all on an isolated fenced in
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concreted area between Appellant's house and garage. Appellant called a witness, who was a friend, a
"Janeal Carter" who also was the owner of the car, and testified that it was situated there for less than
48 hours Tr. Vol. II p. 77, L. 22. And as ridiculous that these ordinances are claimed to be by Appellant
and that he doesn't agree with, even by the city's own definition this couldn't be called and inoperative
vehicle as in Pocatello Municipal Code 8.16.050 which is directly linked through Pocatello Municipal
Code 8.24.040 F. Next the code enforcement officer says that she could see two vehicles behind a
privacy fence Tr. Vol. II p. 42, L. 11, and restates it again saying that they were just parked there Tr.
Vol. II p. 45, L. 2. Appellant questioned the witness officer Mary T. Rasmussen how did you determine
that these other vehicles were inoperable from these vague photographs, as this was the whole basic
Appellant was charged with a crime. and her response was "I would, I would agree that you might be
able to move those vehicles; however, well, I'll just leave it at that." Tr. Vol. II p. 75, L. 13. This seems
to be an incomplete answer and a type of avoidance, the State objected, and the court held it as asked
and answered to the point of not being able to tell if a vehicle can be moved, now a basic person may
take from that that you couldn't tell if it was inoperable either, but technically that part wasn't answered.
Now was this an abuse of discretion by the court, holding a bias and protecting and siding with officer
Mary T. Rasmussen? In fact Appellant did object to this transcript for that very thing, that this
transcript had been altered, it was supposed to be a verbatim recording, but didn't catch this ambiguity
in time for filing an objection, Tr. Vol. II p. 67, L. 13, has the court saying "okay", this is right in the
middle of the witness answering a question, the judge wasn't being addressed and no other place in the
transcript does he do this, because its wrong, he interjected a statement showing protection and bias
stating to the effect of "What don't you think she has enough work to do and that she just sits around?"
The district court didn't allow this augmentation on the transcript but Appellant did state it in the
district court appeal R. Vol I. p. 136, L. 39. Now this is suspiciously possibly altered that maybe
thought it shows the trial judge over stepping his bounds and wouldn't look the best on the transcript. I
did pay for audio disc CD represented on the record as 10 dollars, but never received it. Coincidence?
R. Vol. Ip. 3, L. 48.
In addition, the entire credibility and testimony from the witness, the code enforcement officer
Mary T. Rasmussen should be brought into question. She first testifies that the reason that actually led
her out to do an inspection at the premises on 11/7/12 was that they'd received an anonymous
complaint on a hotline Tr. Vol. II p. 41, L.7, but simply isn't true, and later changed her story saying
she now was following up on the initial case Tr. Vol. II p. 67, L. 14. Appellant feels like she is
perjuring herself here because she conveniently shows up to take pictures on 11 /07 / 12 after not being
there for nearly 2 months of a vehicle that was there less than 48 hours as Appellant's witness Janeal
Carter testified to, so either this is a type of stalking behavior from this code enforcement officer to the
activities of Appellant or she received another complaint. Her police report shows initial inspection of a
complaint from 07/25/2012 R. Vol. Ip. 10,12 (duplicates probably by error, see addendum), and that
11/7/2012 was a re-inspection. Another thing is Officer Rasmussen in her report ironically shows
receiving a complaint and running: right out on this 7/25/2012 and doing an inspection(see police report
in addendum), but then testifies that the code enforcement are too busy and can't get back on the dates
specified for re-inspection on her report. In reality he report doesn't hardly corroborate any of the
photos she took none of the dates match up. In a line of questioning from the Appellant her response to
that is "I forgot to put that in my report" Tr. Vol II. p. 61, L. 9. And this happens nearly every single
time? She's been doing this over l O years and her supervisor allows her to do this? Appellant in his
appellant brief to the district court covered further analysis of these as well R. Vol I. p. 132 L. (bottom).
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Another issue that Appellant finds appalling is the revolving door style pattern of complaint thats used
to keep a claim open, and this officers report shows that and she even testified to it saying "The City
Code addresses the general condition of inoperative vehicles" Tr. Vol II p. 71, L. 20, and "the general
appearance of the property" Tr. Vol II. p. 63, L. 7, so that this visit the enforcement officers can have
complaint about a box, next time its the grass thats a half an inch too long, then its a window, next time
its a car, then its chipped paint, one level of ambiguity after another, but all for no cause of any issue
that they are actually resolving, and if they want to keep this arbitrary harassment going they can as
there isn't anything that's restricting them. This is just a form of oppressive tyranny, as mentioned
earlier a system setup for failure. Even the jury thought so that it was arbitrary by their questions R.
Vol. Ip. 104, that even if you do work to resolve some issues it doesn't matter, the jury was denied
from seeing anything as reasonable doubt or question of law that could have made a difference, but
were shown some photos of a spare tire, and a piece of cardboard, explained that it was illegal and were
even made to promise to convict Tr. Vol. II p. 24, L 3. So there isn't any fair chance in winning against
such opposition. Furthermore Officer Rasmussen also testifies to looking past and taking photographs
past a privacy fence Tr. Vol. II p. 42, L. 11 and p. 44, L. 1, but later testified that in regards to a
complaint item on her report, a large picture window, and the reason is that its visible from the right of
way Tr. Vol. II p. 63, L. 5. And also admits here that this is about appearance, an appearance
ordinance. But where does that leave us with the previous statement of the privacy fences? Appellant
already mentioned his position on these ordinances that they are ridiculous, but it is the City of
Pocatello that made these ordinances and its officials that break and the local representatives of the
State that uphold them as follows:

POCATELLO MUNICIPAL CODE 8.24.050
ENFORCEMENT AND INSPECTION AUTHORITY

A. The building official, his designated representative, code enforcement officer, police officer, or any authorized
representative thereof (hereinafter referred to as city staff) upon his/her own observation, or upon receipt of a
complaint from any person, is authorized and directed to make inspections of property to determine compliance
with this chapter and to pursue enforcement of its provisions for noncompliance.

B. Unscreened exterior areas may be inspected at any time from a public right of way with or without the
involvement of the owner or occupant in accordance with legal requirements governing administrative
inspections of private property.

C. Screened exterior areas may be inspected only during the normal business hours of the city unless otherwise

arranged, and only upon invitation or with the concurrence of the owner or occupant or when
authorized/ordered by a court.

Now its one thing that Officer Rasmussen claims that the window was from a public right of
right of way, which may be considered under Section B above, but what about the screened exterior
that she referred to as a privacy fence, and Pocatello Municipal Code 8.24.020 defines:
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SCREENED AREA EXTERIOR: An area separated by a sight obscuring permanent fence built
to the maximum height and standards allowed by the municipal code for the site.
Officer Rasmussen took photos past this privacy fence, and used in court on public record,
without the authorization from the Appellant or authorized by a warrant under Section C above. After
the citation was given to the Appellant on 11/14/2012, Appellant put up more screening as
recommended by officer Barbre R. Vol. Ip. 12 (this appears to be a clerical error duplicate see
addendum for correct police report), Appellant already had aspirations of putting in a new privacy gate
but was rushed into what is seen on R. Vol. II p. 19-21 to provide a more clear intention of desire to be
left alone, but Officer Rasmussen further circumvented the screened area after citations delivered and
realizing this was going to court to took more photographs not on a public right of way, but off of
private property 2 lots over, without Appellant's or courts authorization from a warrant, and the owner
from this other property would not be able to authorize such a so called inspection essentially a search.
Appellant did object to these photos Tr. Vol. II p. 115, L. 19, but court still accepted them with the bias
arbitrary reasoning from the State, everything that Appellant submitted was not allow to be used but
everything that State submitted was allowed.
To summarize the trial, there was the initial setting up, prepping and narrowing of the trial to
determine the outcome, the acceptance of all the items and testimony from the Respondents witness no
matter how ridiculous, and all the manipulation of the jury in convincing them that actions that every
single person does, that most everybody wouldn't think twice about calling a crime, actually is a crime
under their standard, so they can be shown a picture of things they see everyday with everybody else
that they would hold as their right to have property and be convinced by court room theatrics to call out
a guilty verdict. This mock trial that was made to look like legitimate actions wasn't even that it was a
witch hunt. Appellant was just the unlucky one that got called up to have to try and stand up for his
rights cause it could have been anyone. Even the court had commented saying "he's not getting it"
during the sentencing Tr. Vol II. p. 119, L. 7. Not getting what, whats the lesson to be learned here, that
Appellant can be singled out and not allowed certain freedoms, that every other property owner up the
road uses their property to park camp trailers, atv's and other hobby items on and thats why they have
these properties is for the size of the property lots and garages. There's owners up the road that some
have horses and some have cows. So whats the lesson to be learned, that Appellant has already been
under this prejudice scrutiny before over a shed that the city wanted him to have a permit for, not
because they said it looked of felt like it was unsafe, that their excuse was they thought someone might
live in it something that looked like a barn with big doors and that it may have been covering
Appellants own sewer line that the city doesn't have any dealings with. Then what that Appellant isn't
supposed to question laws he doesn't agree with, that he shouldn't be entitled to equal protection of the
laws and be deprived of property, liberty and due process all in a fascist manner because anyone can
complain regardless of the source of where it comes from that Appellant can be discriminated upon
because someone regardless of any malicious intention that may not like the looks in which the way a
person expresses or lives his lifestyle, that they can send out gestapo like faction to strike down such
things for a view. Is this the lesson to be learned, because these are exactly the type of behaviors and
actions that happened in Nazi Germany before a holocaust ensued, that if Appellant's questioning the
law to this local court this is the type of manipulation and result he can expect? Cause Appellant asserts
that based on all the courts comments during the conclusion of this trial it makes perfect sense that the
judge was completely biased, and was not neutral in his decisions and actions.
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In 2002, the Court found that arbitrary actions by a trial judge in a murder case violated the due
process rights of the defendant (Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 122 S. Ct. 877, 151 L. Ed. 820 [2002]).

2.
ISSUES OF DUE PROCESS UNDER REGULATORY TAKINGS

Appellant restates as earlier under the standard of review that the Supreme Court exercises free
review and under these circumstances under this case based on such non-standard, non-typical, or
probably not very commonly seen very often by the Supreme Court that it may be recommended to
hold a very open free review as in the best interest of not only the Appellant but the public in general as
others may be affected.
Now, a little further background that Appellant feels is very pertinent to this case, is that its one
thing if there were harmless errors during a trial in the interpretation of the laws cause due process
violations, but Appellant believes that these violation may have been more deliberate, avoidance, and
malicious especially considering the events that transpired afterwards. Appellant wasn't sure if things
would work out during this trial. but was hoping that he might get something accomplished.
Immediately after the trial, Appellant filed a regulatory takings claim (see addendum) with the city
clerk as best interpreted proceedings by Appellant and even said he would at the trial Tr. Vol II. p.105,
L. 22. Under the premise that the city is responsible for making such regulations and/or ordinance and
enforced it through administrative action leaving Appellant with a citation ending up in court, that it
was Appellant's prerogative to challenge this as a taking through this orderly process, that it may be
serving the same interest as a permanent occupation by invading into the privacy of citizens, by such
technical limitations that really don't serve any purpose other than some fictitious whimsical claims that
are arbitrary by means of trying to instill panic. This will be further explained and expanded in the
constitutional analysis section.

67-800 I. Declaration of purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to establish an orderly,
consistent review process that better enables state agencies and local governments to
evaluate whether proposed regulatory or administrative actions may result in a taking of
private property without due process of law. It is not the purpose of this chapter to expand
or reduce the scope of private property protections provided in the state and federal
constitutions.
67-8002. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(I) "Local government" means any city, county, taxing district or other political
subdivision of state government with a governing body.
(2) "Private property" means all property protected by the constitution of the United
States or the constitution of the state of Idaho.
(3) "State agency" means the state of Idaho and any officer, agency, board, commission,
department or similar body of the executive branch of the state government.
(4) "Regulatory taking" means a regulatory or administrative action resulting in
deprivation of private property that is the subject of such action. whether such deprivation
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is total or partial, permanent or temporary, in violation of the state or federal constitution.
67-8003. Protection of private property. (I) The attorney general shall establish, by
October ! , !994. an orderly, consistent process, including a checklist, that better enables a
state agency or local government to evaluate proposed regulatory or administrative
actions to assure that such actions do not result in an unconstitutional taking of private
property. The attorney general shall review and update the process at least on an annual
basis to maintain consistency with changes in law. All state agencies and local
governments shall follow the guidelines of the attorney general.
(2) Upon the written request of an owner of real property that is the subject of such
action, such request being filed with the clerk or the agency or entity undertaking the
regulatory or administrative action not more than twenty-eight (28) days after the final
decision concerning the matter at issue, a state agency or local governmental entity shall
prepare a written taking analysis concerning the action. Any regulatory taking analysis
prepared hereto shall comply with the process set forth in this chapter, including use of
the checklist developed by the attorney general pursuant to subsection ( l) of this section
and shall be provided to the real property owner no longer than forty-two (42) days after
the date of filing the request with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose action is
questioned. A regulatory taking analysis prepared pursuant to this section shall be
considered public information.
(3) A governmental action is voidable if a written taking analysis is not prepared after a
request has been made pursuant to this chapter. A private real property owner, whose
property is the subject of governmental action. affected by a governmental action without
the preparation of a requested taking analysis as required by this section may seek judicial
determination of the validity of the governmental action by initiating a declaratory
judgment action or other appropriate legal procedure. A suit seeking to invalidate a
governmental action for noncompliance with subsection (2) of this section must be filed
in a district court in the county in which the private property owner's affected real
property is located. If the aftected property is located in more than one (I) county. the
private property owner may file suit in any county in which the affected real property is
located.
(4) During the preparation of the taking analysis, any time limitation relevant to the
regulatory or administrative actions shall be tolled. Such tolling shall cease when the
taking analysis has been provided to the property owner. Both the request for a taking
analysis and the taking analysis shall be part of the official record regarding the
regulatory or administrative action.

"Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines"
http://www.ag.idaho.gov/publications/legalManuals/RegulatoryTakings.pdf

But the City of Pocatello never responded and ignored the request from the Appellant.
Appellant in addition to being distressed and appalled at the Code Enforcement Officers actions wanted
to report and complain not only on his behalf but for the wellbeing of the publics, a letter of complaint
reporting such actions that they are taking, invading into privacy and trespassing on properties and that
this was all uncalled for. I stated my concern about all these photos that were taken before even going
to trial, and was addressed to internal affairs department, and duplicates were sent to the mayors office
and the governor's office because he's on the Constitutional Defense Council under Statute Title 67
chapter 63. I was hoping to get some sort of response at least an acknowledgement, but all I got was a

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13

letter back the very next day my letter would have been received, from the chief of police about how
he's read through the court case, and they were following up the instructions on that, which seems to be
a smoke screen cause all my concerns were from the actions all before that about the Code
Enforcement Officer and even her supervisor and the unprofessionalism that is going on and that there
should be an investigation, but all Appellant got was this letter of excuse and avoidance, (see
addendum). Even the Officer Barbre who commented on the police report mentioned it was ridiculous
and hadn't seen anything like it, and added his own observations on the case after discussing (also see
addendum).
After all the afore mentioned events have happened the next thing for the Appellant to do was to
take the next step. To the best of Appellants ability, understanding and interpretation of the "Idaho
Regulatory Takings Act", that this action by the City of Pocatello of making such a regulation and/or
ordinance and enforced it through administrative action by a citation starting the court proceedings, and
since also the city didn't respond to a takings request, Appellant sought resolve according to section
67-8003(3) for non-compliance all of which related to an ongoing appeal. So Appellant sent in the
request for declaratory judgment or judicial review along side Appellant's brief R. Vol. Ip. 128, in the
hopes that at least a hearing may be held or some other action. Now there isn't a lot of specification in
its description under 67-8003(3) it just says "or other appropriate legal procedure". Appellant was
completely ignored on this to the fact that he filed a legal document, not even any response to say that a
separate filing may be requested, nothing. The Respondent in his brief did address his view stating "the
action taken by the State was criminal, not regulatory or administrative, in nature." R. Vol. Ip 162, L.
1 L but Appellant claims this is a lie and false. Under Title 50-302 it says "Cities shall make all such
ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of
Idaho. Appellant asserts that these are one in the same that an actual valid regulation being broken is
pursued with criminal charges. Also under the Idaho Constitution Article 12 Section 2 it says: Any
county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police,
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. It calls
these actions regulations, and lastly even under Pocatello's own code that Appellant was charged with
as mentioned under section 8.24.050(B) for unscreened areas it says: Unscreened exterior areas may be
inspected at any time from a public right of way with or without the involvement of the owner or
occupant in accordance with legal requirements governing adniinistrative inspections of private
property. As it shows here even under the cities own documentation its referred to as an administrative
action. So how would the Respondent think that the "Regulatory Takings Act" wouldn't be appropriate,
Appellant assumes its probably so the city can enforce some makeshift definition of a misdemeanor
they created to sell us off on this ordinance propaganda.
The other detail that is rather pertinent is the fact before Appellant went to court, sent off an
email and/or request to see what kind of aid that the attorney general of Idaho might be able to since as
it explains under this "Idaho Regulatory Takings Act" that he is responsible for establishing this
orderly process. I explained the entire circumstance about the harassment, explained and listed the
ordinance, and that I was going to have to go to court over this. I had done this because I didn't
necessarily believe that I would find resolve or justice from these local courts as no one around here
says that about them, and I was right. But did the attorney general's office say that they didn't think that
this regulatory takings didn't apply or that thats not really what it means to challenging this ordinance
or the actions thereof? Quite the contrary, they sent me the booklet outline on regulatory takings, and
with the letter basically wished me luck but couldn't intervene, which of course now makes sense after
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going this for with this issue where the attorney general is the States representative.
So even up to this point under the definition in the regulatory takings act, since the city failed to
respond these actions are and should be considered voidable. But it seems very apparent that there is a
big attitude of seemingly deliberate avoidance, all the events through the trial, the refusal of the proper
city representatives to even respond to a takings analysis request, the excuses and run-around response
from the chief of police from a letter intended for internal affairs, the ignoring of a filed legal action for
declaratory judgment or judicial review, even the statements by the Respondent in his brief, and the
actions and responses from the district judge(that will address next) as if its trying to be contained and
concealed. Appellant believes is that there is an explanation why, it says under this statute 67-8003(2)
Upon the written request of an owner of real property: "A regulatory taking analysis prepared pursuant
to this section shall be considered public information." Its obvious that they don't want anyone to
question their means of making and enforcing these local regulations and ordinances. When those who
are trusted to make and enforce laws and rules do it under the cover of darkness without public
knowledge and do things to conceal it being questioned for legitimacy as a matter of public record
usually means that their doing something illegal. If Appellant was in the wrong, if they actually had
legitimate answers to say why Appellant was wrong then why not face him and answer if they have
nothing to hide. This is a form of damage control from being called out for trying to run local
government like their own private dictatorial system. The fact of the matter is that all these
representatives and Respondent are all wrong and they know it. Appellant did go over in detail over a
number of concerns regarding this and some other beliefs about it R. Vol I. p. 128.

3.
ISSUES DURING DISTRICT COURT APPEAL

Appellant from the beginning and still holds that this case is about his liberties and rights and
rights to property that are trying to be criminalized, and has been standing up for his rights which
makes this a non standard case especially none of the claims by the city under this ordinance or the
Respondent are recognized under any statute as a crime. Most citizens would not recognize them as
such either. If a person were charged with something, as an example, like fraud, Assault, of theft, the
average person would knowingly understand that even though they shouldn't have done it that society
recognizes these as a crime, and most would hire a lawyer, to also avoid the Pro Se bias even if they
were capable of self representation, and would have all pre-trial motions appropriately used, which
brings me to Appellant's next controversial point.
It is very difficult to discern what a lot of the appropriate actions should have been, since the
Appellant claims that this is a taking of rights, liberty, invasion of privacy and the photos taken, and
actions show that. But on the other hand, whether Appellant should have from the beginning filed a
motion to suppress evidence, it is fairly controversial because of the questions of law involved, but
Appellant asserts this review in the district court changes to a due process violation as well. Appellant
claim that in the memorandum decision by the district court that the findings are not consistent with
due process. Appellant could agree, to a certain extent, as district judge quoted: "Pro se litigants are
held to the same standards and rules as those represented by and attorney." Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706,
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709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (205) (quoting Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442,445, 80 P.3d 1043,
1046 (2003)) and such stating in his analysis R. Vol. Ip. 19L L. 9, and on this reasoning district judge
by IDAHO CRIM. R 12 but this what Appellant claims should be considered a defect in the procedures
since the main intention of Appellant in his motion to suppress was for photos sprung up during the
conclusion of the trial Tr. Vol. II p. 115, L. 10, that these were taken even before the trial but seemingly
used after the jury had been blinded and manipulated to get the verdict wanted then these were used, as
Appellant said before he did object, but how we he have a fair opportunity to file a motion to suppress
if didn't have access to everything to know what was going to be used, so these should have been
considered evidence by illegal search without a warrant, in addition it does say at the bottom of this
rule 12 section (f) ", but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver". But if Appellant
knew this would have turned into a full fledged fight void of the constitutional questions of law then
may have tried to things differently with a motion to suppress from the beginning and/or even with a
lawyer. Also by this same reasoning that district judge should have considered the extra documents the
Appellant supplied as pertinent to the case as well to support the question of law that he granted the
order of appeal on the grounds of both fact and question of law, and also stated under the standard of
review it would be: "Thus this court will review the record independently of, but with due regard for,
the decision of the magistrate court." State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941,942, 792 P. 2d 966,967 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1990). Tr. Vol I. p. 190, L. 12.
District judge used a reasoning that Appellant failed to present coherent argument, but
Appellant holds that this is excuse to divert from the facts. The point is this case was more about the
question of law and not to quibble over the details whether there was adequate evidence to convict
Appellant under such blinded prepared circumstances, that a jury can be shown a few photos of basic
things: tools sitting in yard, a tire, tree limbs, crates or even some loose siding or chipped paint and be
told that its illegal and be able to secure a conviction every single time. As Appellant explained in his
brief and elaborated on all the concerning issues, that he was confident that there would have been
adequate doubt in the trial in explaining under the Idaho and U.S. Constitution and Statutes that a
person has the right to have property, liberty and the right retreat upon his own property free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion, that this government has no right in depriving a person from
them on the premise from an unfounded local rule that is arbitrary and without justifiable cause, that
that would have changed the outcome of the trial, as it already seemed the jury was hesitant in their
decision, concerned that it could possibly happen to them over a box they might have on a porch, but
felt was obligated to respond to what was only presented to them. Appellant claims this is an abuse of
discretion, and agrees with the district judge's statements here but with opposite conclusion and that it
is an err on his part that, "questions of admissibility often involve the exercise of the trial courts
discretion, the threshold determination of whether the evidence offered is 'relevant' presents an issue of
law over which fthe reviewing courtl exercises free review." State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 134,
867 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). Such determination will not be overturned on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Under Rule 401 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, "relevant evidence" is defined
"as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence."
Idaho R. of Evidence 401(2012). "All relevant evidence is admissible unless excludable on certain
grounds. I.R.E. 402; State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 804 P.2d 936 (Ct.App.1991)." R. Vol. Ip. 195,
L. 21.
But this goes without saying that the district court appellant brief was lengthy, but all concerns
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were reiterated in a more concise way and cleaned it up a bit to focus on the highlights in the
cross-respondent brief, but all was still there previously. Not that it may have done any good Appellant
suspects judge didn't read all and refused to because his decision was already made.
When it comes to the the district court addressing the unconstitutionality of the ordinance,
Appellant holds that he was very unobjective. The district court cites both Plummer v. City of
Fruitland,, 139 Idaho 810, 813, 87 P.3d 297, 300 (2004 ), and Sanchez, 135 Idaho at 468, 20 P.3d at 4,
that although the findings of these cases that it still isn't to the same standard since they both are about
a business or service provided where this case is centered around the sanctity of a private citizens home
, so weighing a constitutional challenge should be more stringent and treaded more lightly. Appellant
holds that district court took his findings out of context and even went the other direction with what
he'd said.
"This Court exercises free review over constitutional questions." Quinlan v. Idaho Com'n for
Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003). When considering the
constitutionality of a city ordinance, this Court's review is de novo. Sanchez v. City of Caldwell, 135
Idaho 465,467, 20 P.3d l, 3 (2001 ).
When this Court considers a claim that a city ordinance is unconstitutional, we review the trial
court's ruling de novo since it involves purely a question of law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969
P.2d 244 (1998).
This general grant of police power, however, is limited by the restriction that ordinances
enacted under the authority conferred by this constitutional provision must not be unreasonable or
arbitrary. Benewah County Cattlemen's Association, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of
Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983).
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States considering the issue have held that a
municipality's ability to regulate the collection of waste and garbage is a police power function.
"Authority over refuse has been treated as part of the police power that covers the plenum of authority
to legislate for the general welfare of society." Pleasant Hill Bayshore Disposal, Inc. v. Chip-It
Recycling, Inc., 91 Cal.App.4th 678, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 708, 716 (2001). The United States Supreme
Court also held in California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works of San Francisco, 199 U.S.
306, 26 S.Ct. l 00, 50 L.Ed. 204 ( 1905), that regulation of garbage disposal services is a proper police
power function of a municipality. In California Reduction Co., the California Constitution contained
wording regarding police powers and sanitation regulation almost identical to Idaho's Art. XII, § 2.
It is not the province of courts, except in clear cases, to interfere with the exercise of the power
reposed by law in municipal corporations for the protection of local rights and the health and welfare of
the people in the community. Id. The Court is not concerned with the wisdom of the ordinance. That
is a matter for the legislative authority. Gartland v. Talbott, 72 Idaho 125, 237 P.2d 1067 ( 1951).
The ordinance will be upheld unless it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho
365, 399 P.2d 955 (1965).
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution of the State of Idaho provides:Local police
regulations authorized.-Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with
the general laws. The phrase "general laws" includes other provisions of the state constitution, acts of
the state legislature, and the constitution and laws of the United States. Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70
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Idaho 343, 218 P.2d 695 (1950).
Its obvious to see that the intent of these local policing powers, sanitary, and other regulations
are all in a very general and public nature, usually all to where the public is physically involved either
by where a franchise, business or service is being rendered where regulation would be necessary and
appropriate, and even garbage collection as a topic above. These general policing powers were meant
to affect the entire public as a whole and for good reason but it wasn't the legislative intention to cross
over into the private sanctity and sphere, and private life of individuals. What claim does the public
have on this realm to infer claim into the private existence of a person where they have their area to
express their own personality, and individualism to retreat from the public, and to have their things.
The answer is they don't, there isn't any general invitation for the public to be in or on a persons private
property. There are other statutes and laws that come into play if a persons behaviors or actions get out
of control, cross the line and become too inappropriate where its actually affecting the public, but at the
base, or core and at the top is the very rights in protecting a person everything centers around that.
When all these individual rights are protected, it is protecting the public, because the public is
comprised of all unique individuals, and individualism is very important.

4.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Many issues regarding due process, procedural defects, and regulatory takings have already
been covered by Appellant to the fact that many of Appellant's rights and a number of others were
further violated in the cities and Respondents maintaining their position over this ordinance that is
comprising this tort. Appellant wanted to cover this section to compare the unconstitutional nature of
this local ordinance, Pocatello Municipal Code 8.24 and 8.16. that has been his stance from the
beginning, but refused any opportunity for fair analysis, and will explain how this local government's
actions in pursuit of local municipal code is not a State interest and that it really bears no benefit to the
public, it's actually quite the opposite, its a morale destroyer. Especially since Article 1 Section 1.
declares that it is an inalienable right of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing
and protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety.
This local code PMC 8.24 claims that it is promoting and protecting citizens health, safety, and
welfare by what they call uniform maintenance standards. This certainly sounds like forced living
conditions. In, fact this is such a ridiculous word-on-play trying to convince the citizens that its actually
detrimental to public health if property and things don't have a certain appearance, that thats what it
says its purpose is that its a matter of health, safety, and welfare and it protects neighborhoods and
citizens from things they may not like to see, well I, Appellant don't believe this and am not buying into
this propaganda. In fact, this whole section is nothing more than a bunch of prohibitions and
restrictions on nearly everything essentially making life illegal, that you cant do this and you can't do
that, and if you don't do this than you will be charged with a crime. And essentially a person has to
have their permission for things, that they also offer a temporary conditional permit. Oh and that the
city has declared their own authority to do inspections of properties to make sure that the citizens are
obeying their living standards. And its obvious that this has gone far beyond any authority or power
conferred upon with legislative intent since the city is a municipal corporation and is not a legislative
branch of government, and can't do things outside of the power granted to it, but thats what's happened.
This ordinance is inconsistent and even contradictory to the statutes and constitution, as it states under
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Statute for municipal corporations: powers Title 50-301: "and exercise all powers and perform all
functions of local self-government in city affairs as are not spec(fically prohibited by or in conflict with
the general laws or the constitution of the state of Idaho." And its also stated under Statute Title 50-302
for Promotion of General Welfare: "Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations
and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be expedient." And the City
of Pocatello claims through its ordinance that these actions protect the health of the citizens, but that
simply is untrue. Even under Statute Title 50-304 it says: "pass all ordinances and make all
regulations necessary to preserve the public health; prevent the introduction of contagious diseases
into the city; make quarantine laws for that purpose." There is no mention and the context doesn't
show here of invading into the privacy of a citizen to check and see if they have loose paint or siding
falling of in the name of public health. Also it isn't recognized anywhere under Statute Title 39 for
Health And Safety. This seems to cover about everything theres chapters covering: ''health regulations
for food, health facilities, control of venereal diseases, water quality, health facilities, day care" all of a
very publicly involved nature but nothing covering regulating into the sanctity of a private home or
property because of loose shingles, broken fence, extra truck, chipped paint, loose siding has anything
to do with public health or safety. In fact to show the inconsistent nature of this ordinance with the
statutes "As A Comparison" since a majority of the verbiage deals with industrial and commercial for
ground water protection under Title 39 Chapter 1.
Title 39-102(2) has a statement: "All ground water shall be protected as a valuable public
resource against unreasonable contamination or deterioration. The quality of degraded ground water
shall be restored where feasible and appropriate to support identified beneficial uses. "
Title 39-102(3)(c )( d) states: "c. All persons in the state should conduct their activities so as to
prevent the nonregulated release of contaminants into ground water.
d. Education of the citizens of the state is necessary to preserve and restore ground water quality.
And some definitions regarding this: Title 39-103(2) states: "Air pollution" means the presence
in the outdoor atmosphere of any contaminant or combination thereof in such quantity of such nature
and duration and under such conditions as would be injurious to human health or welfare, to animal or
plant life, or to property, or to interfere unreasonably with the enjoyment of life or property.
Title 39-103( 17) states: ""Water pollution" is such alteration of the physical, thermal,
chemical, biological or radioactive properties of any waters of the state, or such discharge of any
contaminant into the waters of the state as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters
harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or to domestic, commercial,
industrial, recreational, esthetic or other legitimate uses or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or
other aquatic life.
And in the event the director shall deem advisable: Title 39-108(a) States: Conduct a program
of continuing surveillance and of regular or periodic inspection of actual or potential environmental
hazards, air contamination sources, water pollution sources, and of solid waste disposal sites;
Now mind you that this is on a big scale usually intended for industrial or commercial, a private
citizen would have to be doing a lot of dumping out or whatever of contaminants by definition to come
close to causing a problem outside of normal citizen activity. I, Appellant, highly doubt they would
waste their time and that its referring to someone who knocked over a quart of motor oil while trying to
add it to their vehicle that could be cleaned up with kitty litter. But in any event if something seemed
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that bad necessary of action it states:
Title 39-108( c) "All inspections and investigations conducted under the authority of this chapter
shall be performed in conformity with the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures
contained in the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United States and section 17, article I, of
the constitution of the state of Idaho. The state shall not, under the authority granted by this chapter,
conduct warrantless searches of private property in the absence of either consent from the property
owner or occupier or exigent circumstances such as a public health or environmental emergency;

As can be determined by the context of that statute on environmental quality that action is only
taken by actual concerns over large items that could actually have an impact on the public, and shall
follow proper procedures especially when it comes investigations and also private property rights.

Appellant makes the point that these two local ordinances: Pocatello Municipal Code 8.24 and
as it relates to 8.16 are trying to make the claim that the appearance of private things is a matter of
public health, safety, and welfare, and a lot of which is arbitrary, as to the attempt at causing panicky
concerns that this might happen or that might happen and that the only way to protect the citizens is to
preemptively to deprive citizens of their right to choose how to have and how much property to have
and what kind of condition they can have it in, and the way they express themselves, over
circumstances the city cant prove an example such as: PMC 8.24.040 A "including conditions or
accumulations of any material which may be conducive to infestations of insects, spiders, reptiles, or
rodents". And also", and anything whatsoever in which insects may breed or which provides
harborage for rodents, snakes, or other harmful pests/animals."

Appellant asserts that all these claims are absurd and ridiculous, this effort of all this prohibition
of items that are citizens inalienable rights to acquire and protect property. Then also that you can only
have firewood if its neatly stacked. well that seems to contradict the claim of not having things
conducive to harborage of bugs, cause anytime I ever cut down a tree a stacked thats where its more
likely to happen, and also you can't store items unless its all crammed in your garage? That sounds
more like something that would be a safe haven for rodents if anything. What are we expected to tear
that down too? This doesn't seem to be anything more that a technical limitation that says you have to
keep you yard looking pretty with nothing on it so its rendered useless, and now your garage is
rendered useless now too because it can't even be accessed. If anything sounds like it would affect
property values this does, cause many people that choose to live a certain type of do it yourselfer,
"redneck" type, or activity based lifestyle are going to value things differently and try and find
properties to support their lifestyles.
The other thing that Appellant points out is that under Article 12 Section I ''The legislature
shall provide by general laws for the incorporation, organization and classification of the cities and
towns, in proportion to the population, which laws may be altered, amended, or repealed by the
general laws."
And Appellant says that there no where in the general laws that allows such a municipal
corporation to change the definition and deem whatever wanted outside of what a public nuisance is as
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in PMC 8.16.050 as it relates and is linked from PMC 8.24.040([) as it states "and is detrimental to
public health, safety, and welfare due to factors such as broken glass, standing water, accumulation of
rusted parts, potential environmental damage, and the potential for breeding of vermin, and is hereby
deemed a public nuisance." This is pointless, how would broken glass actually affect the public, as it
doesn't encroach in a public area, unless someone would be trespassing how would they know? Unless
they were the cause of it, but would have more concern of the owner that some glass under their shoes.
Rusted parts and potential for vermin, really? Vermin don't eat rusted metal. Besides under Title
39-2801 under Abatement Districts Definitions it defines: "Vermin" means small animals, including
insects, of public health and we! fare concern which are difficult to control when they appear in large
numbers. I, Appellant am very concerned over the leadership of this city that can't do a better job than
arbitrarily attempting to deprive citizens of property, because they are throwing their hands up in the air
flailing around panicky because they think citizens can't handle a few bugs or a mouse by either
squashing, bug spray, or traps? Which is all an assumption that those things are happening or will take
place. Even under Statute Title 52-111 for Actions For Nuisance it "in all other cases the action may
be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is
lessened by the nuisance;" which implies action only after someone is injuriously affection not on the
presumption, and that under this statute also to be a public nuisance an entire community or
neighborhood or considerable number of persons has to be affected, everything else is defined as a
private nuisance which doesn't carry the same action for resolve as indictment or information.
One of the main points that Appellant during this case, has made is that no legitimate claim of
an offense has been presented. The only claim is that some cluttered items were seen, but how is that
uncommon when a person's in the middle of a work project. Appellant had covered some explanations
to the theory of the motivations by the city were about money, from a questionably defective and
unconstitutional property taxing system at R. Vol. Ip. 128. But as Appellant has already stated that its
not within the charter of this municipal corporation to make such rules that are in conflict with the
general laws, and also the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions. So far Appellant has commented directly
about the nature of local ordinance PMC 8.24 and 8.16 and completely unreasonable and arbitrary as it
violates a number of rights and what the courts have said are as follows:

Idaho Constitution Article 1 Section l : Defines these as the inalienable rights of man:

All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights,
among which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing
safety.
It declares here the right as inalienable of acquiring, possessing and protecting property;
inalienable meaning not transferable and not to be conditionalized, like the unreasonable prohibiting
and only having property by getting permission through permits, and citizens certainly value property
differently. Which brings appellant to next point.
14Th Amendment U.S. Constitution:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities <~f citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, libert_v, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person ivithin its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Now here in the context its apparent that a person can't be deprived of things without just cause
and it has to be a good reason. Its understood that this local government through this ordinance is
trying to make a link or connection to public health and safety to try and justify their actions but is
simply untrue and unreasonable. Idaho also has similar support and verbiage in Idaho Constitution
Article 1 Section 13, and the 5 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although this local may not
necessarily be confiscating the property requiring just compensation essentially its the same principal
as their claims imply that a person then has to get rid of things, there is still a loss in value.
Next are the issues of the warrantless searching and the invasion of privacy. Appellant already
covered this topic and discussion a bit in the district court appellant brief R. Vol I. p.139.
4Th Amendment to U.S. Constitution and Idaho Constitution Article l Section 17:
The right cl the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or thhigs to be seized.
In Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 ( 1928), Brandeis, then a
Supreme Court justice, articulated a general constitutional right "to be let alone," which he described as
the most comprehensive and valued right of civilized people. For the next half century, the right to
privacy gradually evolved. Today, every jurisdiction in the country recognizes some form of
constitutional, common-law, or statutory right to privacy.
The right of privacy protected by the Constitution gained a foothold in Griswold v. Connecticut
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678. 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 ( 1965)the Court held that a general right to privacy may
be inferred from the express language of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as
well as from the interests protected by them.
Held that recording by police of conversation in public telephone booth was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, because the speaker had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the booth. Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
At the Fourth Amendment's "very core" stands "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreason-able governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511.
The area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"-the curtilage-is "part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 180.
The officers entered the curtilage here: The front porch is the classic
exemplar of an area "to which the activity of home life extends."
Florida v. Jardines Id., at 182, n. 12. Pp. 4-5.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Activities within the curtilage are nonetheless still
entitled to some Fourth Amendment protection. The Court has described four considerations for
determining whether an area falls within the curtilage: proximity to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure also surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put,
and the steps taken by the resident to shield the area from view of passersby.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 ( 1986) (suggesting that aerial photography of
the curtilage would be impermissible).
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Appellant states that this is an intrusion upon seclusion and as well an invasion of private sphere
by government. As well as under these standards that the activities by the code enforcement officer was
a search under the 4th amendment, not once but multiple times, and in the instance that the back yard
area being blocked by fencing with ·'no trespassing" signs, and usually blocked with a vehicle, that
Appellant further took actions in his intention of desiring separation and seclusion by obstructing more
view with fencing material, but code enforcement officer not only was trespassing into privacy also
circumvented around the 4 th Amendment to take photos R. Vol. II p. 8-12, off of private property still
without trying to procure a warrant for her claim of probable cause, and also violating neighbors
privacy.
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (officers observed contraband in
view through open doorway: had probable cause to procure warrant).
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. l (1932) (officers observed contraband in plain view
in garage, warrantless entry to seize was unconstitutional).
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (police lawfully in apartment to investigate
shooting lacked probable cause to inspect expensive stereo equipment to record serial numbers)

There has never been any doubt that search warrants could be issued for the seizure of
contraband and the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. Somewhat similar in rationale is the rule that
objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure without a warrant or that, if the officer needs a warrant or probable cause to
search and seize, his lawful observation will provide grounds therefor. The plain view doctrine is
limited, however, by the probable cause requirement: officers must have probable cause to believe that
items in plain view are contraband before they may search or seize them.
The question here is did the officer sec contraband, things that are seen everyday on every
property? The answer is no. And did the officer have the right to be in the position to have that view?
The answer is no.

The next point Appellant will address is this claim of blight and ugliness. Not only is it a right
of citizens usually related to the U.S. Constitution 1st Amendment and a number of others for self
expression whether it be personal appearance: hair, piercings, tattoos, that it is also through
environment and living lifestyles. Whether a person feels appropriate to be clean cut, "redneck",
do-it-yourselfer, or even a culture like the Amish that try to have the most simplistic living for in search
of humbleness and religious reasons. These rights are in place more in protecting the public by
protecting all persons individualism. Most people depending on their lifestyles will seek places to live
similar to their interests that suit their purpose in which they feel comfortable. Some citizens who want
nice looking things will possibly seek to live in a home owners association area. Appellant doesn't live
in this kind of area, and all the efforts in fencing and tarps, and other efforts spending money appellant
didn't have in trying to resolve this issue in the most civil manner, and the fact that for sometime
appellant has worked on some patents, scrimping and saving, and trying to develop a prototype, these
actions may have cost Appellant dearly and even the opportunity. The whole point blight and ugliness
isn't a legitimate claim. Beauty and ugliness is in the eye of the beholder. And the only mention of
blight in the statutes is under Statute Title 50 Chapter 20 for the ''Urban Renewal Law" and states that
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the only resolve that can be done is if an area that is so deteriorated and blighted as to resemble a slum
that where property taxes are probably not being collected, where crime is rampant and costing the city
more than its worth to not redevelop it. But no action at all can even be initiated unless upon that
determination and a plan has to already be put into place. Also it isn't even implicit into the laws of
nuisance that seeing things are meant to be part of that unless its a moral nuisance. The public doesn't
have claim or the right to influence or manipulate into the private affairs and living conditions of
another based on appearance as this trial judge was trying to implicate Tr. Vol IL p. 118, L.14, since it
doesn't encroach out upon them and put them out and cause undue hardship like a regular nuisance
might. And as he made further assumptions about property values, which aren't evaluated that way nor
should they be, but on the contrary a person shopping for similar interests would find more value in
seeing how properties in this area are utilized. This claim for appearance doesn't do anything but open
citizens up to malicious attack. If a person doesn't like something well then they don't have to look at it.
For example, the government may not forbid a movie theater from displaying nude scenes on a
large outdoor screen that is visible to passing motorists. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,LlJ 422
U.S. 205, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975), the Supreme Court said that the First Amendment
right to show such films outweighs the privacy interests of offended passersby who can protect their
sensitivity by averting their eyes.
Unless there is a legitimate concern of an actual public offense, then this business of appearance
isn't a legitimate action under these circumstances and the public and the city have no vested interest as
they don't pay a person's property taxes or pay their maintenance. Oh its nice and all when things can
look good but, when at the point when based on appearance that people are forced claiming its a
general duty to maintain property a certain way, under these forced living standards and held under
duress for failure to comply all under the premise that certain conditions are potential to happen or may
or might happen, is a form of involuntary servitude which is forbidden to exist under U.S. Constitution
Amendment 13:

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Appellant does suspect and believe that the ongoing actions by all the involved local
governmental officials is an ongoing "Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law" U.S. Code Title 18,
U.S.C., Section 242. and maybe ''Conspiracy Against Rights" U.S. Code Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241.
That even it we did consider for a second that this local ordinance was legitimate, and that the local
government and Respondent's claim that its to protect citizens, then that means that under those
statutes, since they've only arbitrarily singled out appellant and a few others, and not gone after every
single property owner, because there is something you could find wrong with every house under this
ordinance, that they would be guilty of failure to protect citizens, either way they are guilty of
something, either of not protecting citizens or depriving Appellant of his rights and property under an
arbitrary ordinance. That Officer Barbre who delivered Appellant the citation said thats why he moved
out of town because he didn't agree with this, cause he liked working on cars too, but had to deliver that
citation. So it says in the code that a vehicle even though may be a place for so called harborage of
vermin, its okay by getting permission by a permit on your own property, but if it runs out you have to
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get rid of it or its a crime. This sounds like nothing less than a money making scam. Appellant isn't and
hasn't been the only one to refuse to comply with this ridiculousness. This is a perfect example of the
excessive regulation thats gong on in this state and country that is destroying its sovereignty and
freedom. What if
economy keeps getting even worse, and people really can't afford to fix anything,
what are they going do then? Really start handing out citations and locking people up over this?Some
citizens are already there, are struggling to feed themselves. Appellant even sent of request for
investigation to the FBI, since it was apparent that no local internal affairs activity was going to
happen, is something going to happen with that? Appellant doesn't know, no response. Appellant has
even contacted civil rights and property rights protection organizations, but not so willing to help since
this is such a low scale incident that isn't that common. Their are shows on tv exploiting property and
treasures all over the country. Even States such as California and Montana have added extra provisions
in their constitutions towards privacy as an inalienable right, and essential to the well-being of a free
society. So why is it seemingly that Idaho or at least this local government is going the wrong way.

V.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant has made a compelling case to show that these local ordinances Pocatello Municipal
Codes 8.24 and 8.16 are unreasonable and arbitrary, and unconstitutional. Appellant has demonstrated
that numerous times that this has been a violation of due process, abuses of discretion, with other
concerns such as the attempted criminalizing of rights that citizens hold, and that many of Appellants
rights have been violated, and that Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Appellant hereby
requests that this Court reverse the decisions and actions of the District Court and Magistrate Court.

Dated this 29th day of April, 2014.

Jared Bristol Pro Se
On Behalf of Himself
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jared Bristol, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the "Appellant's Brief' was sent to
the following individuals by U.S. Mail:

IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

and copies to:

Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court & Court of Appeals
451 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Dated this 29 th day of April, 2014.

Jared Bristol Pro Se
On Behalf of Himself
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Chapter 8.24
PROPERTY MAINTENANCE CODE
8.24.010: PURPOSE AND SCOPE:
The purpose of this chapter is to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens by
protecting neighborhoods against blight and deterioration through the establishment and
enforcement of uniform maintenance standards for all structures and land within the city limits.
(Ord. 2773, 2005)

8.24.020: DEFINITIONS:
The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this chapter:
ACCUMULATION: A quantity of objects gathered into a pile or strewn about on a premises. In
the case of appliances, more than one such item constitutes an accumulation.
BLIGHT: A condition characterized by physical deterioration or disrepair resulting in unsightly,
malodorous, rotting, unhealthy, dilapidated, or unsafe structures, property, or vegetation,
including, but not limited to, the presence of debris; dead or damaged landscaping; broken,
rotted, crumbling, peeling, or rusting material, structures, or surfaces; and rotting
accumulations or piles of garbage or vegetation.
CANOPY: A structure consisting of cloth, metal, fiberglass, or other covering material
fastened to poles or posts designed to be affixed to or placed directly on the ground or onto
other surface material such as concrete.
DEBRIS: Any substance that is broken or destroyed, discarded, or of little or no apparent
economic value whether strewn loosely on an area or piled in one or more spots.
DETERIORATION: A lowering in quality of the condition or appearance of vegetation or of
any structure or parts thereof. A state of deterioration may be characterized by holes, breaks,
rot, crumbling, cracking, peeling, rusting, or any other evidence of physical decay, disease,
neglect, lack of maintenance, or any other evidence of insufficient or inadequate
A maintenance.
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DRIVEWAY: A prepared surface consisting of concrete, gravel, brick or asphalt leading to a
street or alley by means of an approved approach or curb cut, used for parking and/or
vehicular movement to and from a parcelof land.
FIRE HAZARD: Any thing, condition, or act which increases or may cause an increase of the
likelihood of fire to a greater degree than that customarily recognized as normal by persons in
the public service regularly engaged in preventing, suppressing, or extinguishing fire; or any
thing or act which may obstruct, delay, hinder, or interfere with the operations of the city's fire
department or the egress of occupants in the event of fire.
GARBAGE: Includes all organic and inorganic material that is discarded or unused, including,
but not limited to, paper, rubbish, refuse or litter, unconsumed food and anything else
commonly referred to or considered as household or commercial waste.
HAZARD: A condition presenting a likelihood for causing harm due to incompletion,
deterioration, improper construction, breakage, leakage, or exposure.
INFESTATION: The presence of insects, rodents, or animals in such numbers as to result in
an unpleasant, harmful, damaging, unhealthy, or unsafe condition.
LANDSCAPING: Cultivated vegetation including lawn grasses, ornamental or food source
plants, shrubs, and trees (excluding plants commonly classified as weeds); or arranged
landscaping materials such as rocks, bark, water features, and similar items deliberately
placed as part of a decorative scheme.
OCCUPANT: An individual, partnership, corporation or other entity that, through rights of
ownership or rental, has the use and enjoyment of the subject real property for residential or
commercial purposes.
PREPARED SURFACE: Ground covered by gravel, concrete, or asphalt, specifically
excluding bare dirt or vegetative material.
PROPERTY MANAGER: An individual, partnership, corporation or other entity with the
authority and ability to make repairs and the authority to oversee and provide for maintenance
and general care of the property on behalf of the owner; may also be the owner.
PROPERTY OWNER: An individual, partnership, corporation or other entity listed as owner in
the records of the Bannock County assessor.
SCREENED AREA, EXTERIOR: An area separated by a sight obscuring permanent fence
built to the maximum height and standards allowed by the municipal code for the site.
A

SOUND CONDITION: Free from decay or defect, or able to support itself under reasonable
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loading or weather conditions.
STRUCTURE: Anything built or constructed, including, but not limited to, houses, stores,
walls, roofs, foundations, fences, retaining walls, canopies, or screening walls. (Ord. 2773,
2005)

8.24.030: GENERAL DUTY TO MAINTAIN PROPERTY AND BUILDING
SURFACES:

A. General Duty To Maintain Property; Violation A Misdemeanor: Property owners, managers,
occupants, and any other persons having lawful control over a structure or parcel of land
are hereby required to ensure that all property, structures, and land owned, managed, or
occupied by said parties are maintained in good repair and in neat, orderly, and sound
condition free from blight or deteriorating conditions, and maintained in accordance with
standards and regulations established in this chapter. Prohibited conditions include, but
are not limited to, cracked, chipped or peeling paint, graffiti, broken windows or doors,
deteriorated or missing siding, broken or missing shingles, shakes, or stair treads or
railings, broken or missing fence slats, and the like. Failure to comply with the provisions
of this chapter shall be deemed a misdemeanor and punishable as provided by Idaho
Code for general misdemeanors.

B. Duty To Finish Exterior Building Surfaces: Property owners are hereby required to ensure
that all exterior building surfaces are finished with exterior siding materials appropriate to
the surface such as, but not limited to, painted or stained wood, vinyl or aluminum siding,
Dryvit, stone, brick, shingles, shakes, or metal roofing. (Ord. 2773, 2005)

8.24.040: MAINTENANCE OF LAND/OUTDOOR AREAS:

Property owners, managers, and occupants shall ensure that the following requirements are
met:

A A. General Maintenance Of Land/Outdoor Areas: All land/outdoor areas shall be kept clean

and must be fully landscaped in accordance with city codes except for structures and
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prepared surfaces used for parking or pedestrian or vehicular travel. Land/outdoor areas
must be maintained so as to be free of fire hazards; noxious weeds as set out in the Idaho
state code; mold/fungus growths; and blight or deteriorated conditions, including
conditions or accumulations of any material which may be conducive to infestations of
insects, spiders, reptiles, or rodents. Specifically prohibited items or conditions include, but
are not limited to, the following: any accumulations of litter, garbage, debris, waste
material, accumulations of appliances and/or furniture, broken glass, piles of mixed
material, dry vegetation, rags, empty barrels, boxes, crates, packing cases, mattresses,
bedding, packing straw, packing hay, or other packing material, lumber or building
materials except as provided in this chapter, and anything whatsoever in which insects
may breed or which provides harborage for rodents, snakes, or other harmful
pests/animals.

B. Maintenance Of Landscaping: All front yards must be covered with healthy vegetative
material except where covered by prepared surfaces, landscaping features, or driveways
as allowed by this municipal code. Lawn grass shall be kept trimmed so as to be no higher
than six inches (6") above grade. Noxious weeds, as defined or listed by the Idaho
department of agriculture, are prohibited and eradication measures must be taken
promptly. Other weeds in nonlawn areas (e.g., garden areas, vacant lots) must be kept
trimmed so as to be no higher than twelve inches (12") above grade. All nonweed,
permitted vegetation must be maintained in a healthy, growing condition or must be
removed. The piling of branches, or of dry, dead, or rotting vegetation of any kind is
specifically prohibited.

C. Storage Of Materials Prohibited: Land shall be maintained free of the following additional
blighting influences, including,
not limited to, appliances, broken materials, furniture in
disrepair, wood (except neatly stacked firewood), construction materials, piles of
landscaping or construction materials, scrap metal, or vehicle parts, unless the same are
kept in a fully enclosed building. Recyclable materials may be kept outside, but must be
neatly stacked and removed weekly. Also specifically prohibited is the unenclosed storage
or placement, on any land on which a residential dwelling is located or which is
residentially zoned, of any materials used in connection with a business or home
occupation, whether for the owner or occupant of the dwelling or property, including, but
not limited to, building materials, landscaping materials, equipment, tools, and vehicle
parts, unless the same are permitted through a conditional use permit and maintained in
accordance with the terms of said permit.

A

Exception: Materials for active, ongoing, on site construction or landscaping of property
may be stored in rear yards of that property for the duration of the construction.
Landscaping or construction materials for on site use of the occupant may be stored in
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front and side yards which are visible from an adjacent public right of way for a period no
longer than sixty (60) days, provided the rear yard is not easily accessible or the materials
will be used in the front and side yards.

D. Maintenance Of Fences, Retaining Walls, And Screening Structures: All fences, screening
walls and retaining walls shall be maintained in a safe, structurally sound condition, and
shall not be allowed to deteriorate so as to constitute a blighting influence.

E. Maintenance Of Detention Areas; Adequate Drainage: All detention areas must be
maintained in a neat and serviceable condition so as to prevent the presence of stagnant
water or blighting conditions. All premises shall be maintained so as to prevent water from
stagnating thereon, undermining foundations, or causing excessive runoff which may be
damaging to adjacent property.

F. Provisions For Vehicles Or Vehicle Parts: Vehicles may not be parked on
lawns/landscaping areas, but must be parked on a driveway constructed in accordance
with applicable building codes and city regulations and accessed by an approved
approach or curb cut, or, alternatively, may be parked on another prepared surface
accessible from a driveway or alleyway. Storage of vehicle parts or inoperative vehicles is
allowed only in fully enclosed buildings or as otherwise provided for in
title.

G. Provisions For Canopies: Canopies may be used solely as carports for protection of
vehicles, and must be located on lawfully constructed driveways or other prepared
surfaces. Specifically prohibited is the use of canopy structures in residential areas for
storage of materials except as may be allowed temporarily under the exception paragraph
of subsection C of this section. Canopies must meet the same zoning regulations as
carports in relation to setbacks, height, and the like. (Ord. 2783, 2005: Ord. 2773, 2005)

8.24.050: ENFORCEMENT AND INSPECTION AUTHORITY:

A A. The building official, his designated representative, code enforcement officer, police officer,

or any authorized representative thereof (hereinafter referred to as city staff) upon his/her
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own observation, or upon receipt of a complaint from any person, is authorized and
directed to make inspections of property to determine compliance with this chapter and to
pursue enforcement of its provisions for noncompliance.

B. Unscreened exterior areas may be inspected at any time from a public right of way with or
without the involvement of the owner or occupant in accordance with legal requirements
governing administrative inspections of private property.

C. Screened exterior areas may be inspected only during the normal business hours of the
city unless otherwise arranged, and only upon invitation or with the concurrence of the
owner or occupant or when authorized/ordered by a court.

D. Except in cases of alleged imminent hazards, if the occupant is not the owner of the
premises or dwelling unit to be inspected, the building official, his designated
representative, code enforcement officer, police officer, or any authorized representative
thereof shall provide notice in writing or by telephone to the owner or designated agent as
to the time and place of inspection which shall be set by the city staff member. The owner
or designated agent may be present for the inspection. (Ord. 2773, 2005)

8.24.060: NOTICE OF VIOLATION:

A. If an authorized city staff member confirms by inspection any violation of this chapter, he
shall notify the owner in writing if known, the designated agent/property manager of the
violation and the necessity for corrective action. If the property in violation is not owner
occupied and it contains imminent hazards, the official shall also notify occupants of the
imminent hazards.
Exception: If the violation involves the growth of noxious weeds, city staff shall follow
procedures set out in
- - - - - ~ - - - - code and may contact Bannock County
officials immediately to enforce state regulations against such weeds.

A B. The written notice of violation shall include the property address, a description of the
violation, corrective action needed, name, address, and phone number of the city staff
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member to contact in regard to the violation, and shall give the owner, designated agent,
property manager, and/or occupants two (2) weeks from the date of the notice to remove,
abate, or destroy the condition causing the violation, or to file a written appeal to the
property maintenance appeal board. Forms for appeals shall be provided by code
enforcement officers upon request. Completed appeal requests, accompanied by a
statement of the appellant's plan to correct the violation, must be returned by the
reinspection date set out in the property violation notice. Requests received after the said
date shall not proceed to hearing. Hearings will take place at the next available regularly
scheduled meeting of the board.

C. If aggrieved by the decision of the appeal board, the owner/occupant/manager may then
appeal in writing directly to the city council within three (3) business days of the decision. If
such a request is submitted, the city council shall conduct a hearing upon the matter at its
next available regularly scheduled meeting, and notify the appellant as to the date and
time of the meeting. At the meeting the council will consider whether the requirements
stated in the notice of violation should be modified, withdrawn, or enforced as written, and
shall specify a deadline for any corrective action they deem necessary. (Ord. 2773, 2005)

8.24.070: MISDEMEANOR CITATIONS:
A misdemeanor citation may be issued to any owner/occupant/property manager who, after
notice and opportunity to correct and appeal, fails to remedy the violation. Issuance of such a
citation may be in addition to any civil remedies. (Ord. 2773, 2005)

8.24.080: OTHER ABATEMENT; CIVIL REMEDIES:

Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the city from initiating civil proceedings to compel
compliance with the terms of this chapter, in addition to, or in concert with criminal
proceedings. In any civil proceeding the city shall request attorney fees and costs including
any costs incurred from abatement of the violation by the city. (Ord. 2773, 2005)

A
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Chapter 8.16
INOPERATIVE, UNAUTHORIZED, AND
UNREGISTERED VEHICLES AND MATERIALS
8.16.010: PURPOSE:

The purpose of this chapter is to provide for removal of certain nuisances created by vehicles
and other materials when stored improperly on public streets or private property and to
distinguish between the lawful use of public streets for parking of motor vehicles and the
public nuisance created by unlawful storage or parking of prohibited items. Nothing herein
shall be deemed to preclude vehicle owners from parking any currently registered, operative
vehicle on the streets for an indefinite period of time. (Ord. 2783, 2005)

8.16.020: DEFINITIONS:
For the purposes of this chapter:
INOPERATIVE VEHICLE: Any vehicle which, in its current state, whether due to broken,
defective, or missing parts, including missing or flat tires, missing doors, missing or badly
damaged windshields, or broken or defective parts which are essential for movement, is not
capable of being used as a regular means of transportation.
UNAUTHORIZED: Anything other than a lawfully registered motor vehicle and its lawfully
connected trailer, including, but not limited to, the following: any snowmobile, any boat, any
trailer which is not connected by means of a lawful hitch to an operating, lawfully registered
motor vehicle, any camper shell or camper not mounted on a vehicle, any storage containers,
excluding city authorized garbage containers when located in conformance with city
regulations, any vehicle reported stolen and not yet recovered, and any recreational vehicle
which remains parked on a street longer than authorized in
UNREGISTERED VEHICLE: Any vehicle which is not lawfully and currently registered as
provided in chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code; or any vehicle which does not bear current annual
Idaho license plates or decals; or any vehicle which does not bear current license plates
A issued by another state and is not lawfully and currently registered in that state. (Ord. 2783,
2005)

code.
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8.16.030: USE OF CITY STREETS AUTHORIZED FOR PARKING
REGISTERED, OPERATIVE MOTOR VEHICLES; OTHER USES PROHIBITED
AND DECLARED PUBLIC NUISANCES:

A. The parking, both short term and long term of lawfully registered, operative motor vehicles
is allowed at curb side areas of the streets of the city of Pocatello, provided that the motor
vehicles are not parked in violation of pavement or curb markings or regulatory signs or
traffic devices and provided that they are parked in conformance with parking method
regulations set out elsewhere in this code.

8. The use of the streets as a storage location for unregistered or inoperative motor vehicles,
unauthorized items such as camper shells, boats, unhitched trailers, storage containers, or
other materials is prohibited and the owner(s) may be issued a misdemeanor citation for
violating the prohibition. The continued presence of such unlawfully stored items is inimical
to the well being of the citizens and is hereby declared a public nuisance. All such items
shall be subject to removal as provided hereinafter, the costs of which, including storage,
shall be borne by the owner(s). (Ord. 2783, 2005)

8.16.040: REMOVAL FROM PUBLIC RIGHT OF WAY:

The police department is authorized to cause the immediate removal of any unregistered or
unauthorized vehicle, any unauthorized materials, or any vehicle reported as stolen and not
yet recovered found parked or left on any street or right of way. The department is also
authorized to cause to be removed any vehicle parked on the right of way which is found to be
inoperative, pursuant to notification and removal procedures set forth in chapter 18, title 49,
Idaho Code. Provided however, that, upon notification to the police department that a motor
vehicle has become disabled while being operated, such inoperative vehicle may be left
parked against the curb area of a public right of way for a period not to exceed seventy two
(72) hours for effecting repairs or arranging for removal. (Ord. 2783, 2005)

8.16.050: USE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR STORAGE OF
UNREGISTERED OR INOPERATIVE VEHICLES OR VEHICLE PARTS
A PROHIBITED AND DECLARED A PUBLIC NUISANCE:

Sterling Codifiers, Inc.
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The long term presence on private property outside the confines of enclosed buildings, of
inoperative, wrecked, discarded, partially dismantled, junked, unused, or unregistered
vehicles or vehicle parts contributes to blight and deterioration of neighborhoods and is
detrimental to public health, safety, and welfare due to factors such as broken glass, standing
water, accumulation of rusted parts. potential environmental damage, and the potential for
breeding of vermin, and is hereby deemed a public nuisance. No person in charge or control
of any property within the city, whether as owner, tenant, occupant, lessee or otherwise, shall
allow any such vehicle to remain in the open on such property longer than seventy two (72)
hours. Persons violating this prohibition may be issued a misdemeanor citation and the city
may pursue other legal remedies for removal of the vehicles. This prohibition shall not apply
to a vehicle on the premises of a lawfully operated auto salvage business, towing and storage
business, auto sales business, or governmentally operated auto storage area, when
necessary to the operation of such business enterprise, nor to vehicles for which a repair or
restoration permit has been issued as provided hereinafter. (Ord. 2783, 2005)

8.16.060: TEMPORARY EXCEPTIONS FOR REPAIR AND RESTORATION
PERMITS:

The code enforcement staff are hereby authorized to issue permits for either restoration work
on an inoperative vintage or classic car or repair of one inoperative vehicle and a salvage
vehicle and such vehicle parts as may be necessary for repair under the conditions
established in this section. Code enforcement staff are authorized to deny such permits to an
owner if the property on which the work will be done is not in compliance with property
maintenance regulations set out in this chapter. Code enforcement staff are also authorized to
revoke any permit if the owner violates the terms of the permit or property maintenance
prov1s1ons in =='-··"-'-==this title and does not correct the violations within two (2) weeks
of the date of written notification.

A. Repair Permit The code enforcement staff may issue a thirty (30) day permit to allow the
owner of a vehicle to repair that vehicle on his residential premises by salvaging
parts/equipment from another vehicle owned by him, without storing and/or working on the
vehicles in an enclosed building. There shall be no cost for the permit. Members of the
code enforcement staff are authorized to issue one 30-day extension if requested by the
permittee in order to complete the repair, provided permittee is in compliance with the
terms of the permit and the property maintenance provisions in
=====this title. If
A
no enclosed building is available, storage and work on the vehicles should be
accomplished within the confines of a carport or an area screened from public view. When
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not in an enclosed building and not undergoing actual repair work, both vehicles must be
under a car cover which has been specifically made to fit the contours of and cover the
entire body of the vehicle; blankets, tarpaulins, or other such makeshift coverings are not
allowed. Vehicle parts, equipment, and tools must be neatly stacked and covered when
work is not taking place. At the expiration of the permit or its extension period, the salvage
vehicle must be removed from the premises or the code enforcement staff may cause a
misdemeanor citation to be issued and may also pursue other legal remedies to effect the
removal. Nothing herein shall be construed to allow any person to perform such work in
order to sell the repaired vehicle to another party.

B. Restoration Permit: The code enforcement staff may issue a one year permit to allow the
owner of a vehicle to undertake a project to restore a vehicle as either a "classic" car (a
vehicle at least 30 years old) or an "Idaho old timer" (a vehicle manufactured prior to
January 1, 1943) to its original condition without storing the vehicle and working on it
within an enclosed building. If possible, work must be performed within the confines of a
carport or within a screened area. If not kept in an enclosed building, the vehicle must be
covered with a car cover as described in subsection A of this section whenever work is not
taking place. Members of the code enforcement staff are authorized to issue one 180-day
extension if requested by the permittee in order to complete the repair, provided permittee
is in compliance with the terms of the permit and the property maintenance provisions in
-~-----this title. At the expiration of the permit or its extension period, if the
vehicle is not fully restored to working condition, the owner must either store the vehicle in
a fully enclosed building or remove the vehicle from the property. Failure to do so may
result in issuance of a misdemeanor citation and the city may pursue other legal remedies
to effect the removal. (Ord. 2783, 2005)
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1. Backgrohnd Information'
This form satisfies the written request requirement for a regulatory
taking analysis from a state agency or local governmental entity
pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-8003(2). The owner of the property
subject to the government action must file this with the clerk or
secretary of the agency whose act is questioned within twenty-eight
(28) days of the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A
regulatory taking analysis is considered public information. Such an
analysis is to be performed in accordance with the checklist established
by the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code §
67-8003(1).
See page 7 of the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act
Guidelines for a description of the checklist.

2. Description of Property
a. Location of Property:
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3. Description of Act in Question
a. 1ro/:_,o~ertr tas Affected:

d. Are You the Only Affected Property Owner?~ Yes

CJ No

e. State1Agency or Local Governmental Entity Affecting Property:
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Idaho Regulatory Takings Act Guidelines
APPENDIX C: REGULATORY TAKINGS CHECKLIST

State of Idaho
Office of the Attorney General
F~egulatory Takings Checkiist

Yes

No

1 Does the Re9ulation or Action Result in Either a
1

I

Permanent or Temporary Physical Occupation of
Private Property?

I

I

/ 2 Does the Regulation or Action Require a Property
Owner to Either Dedicate a Portion of Property or
to Grant an Easernent?

3 Does the Regulation Deprive the Owner of All
Economically Viable Uses of the Property?
4 Does the RefJUlation Have a Significant Impact on
the Landowner's Economic Interest?

5 Does the Re~Julation
Attribute of Ownersl1ip?

Deny

a

Fundamental

6 (a) Does the Regulation Serve the Same Purpose
That Would Be Served by Directly Prohibiting
the Use or Action?
(b) Does the Condition Imposed Substantially
Advance That Purpose?

Remember: Although a quf?Stion may be answered affirmatively, it does
not mean that there has been a "taking." Rather, it means there could be a
constitutional issue and that proposed action should be carefully reviewed
with legal counsel.
····--··-----···········-···........... ----····..··. ···..···. ····•·..···----. ··-·······.. ·-···..··-·...................................................................................... _... ___............._.,··---·······- ---........................................ -.....
.

This ct1ecklist should be included with a requested analysis
pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-8003(2).
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POCATELLO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Scott L. Marchand, Chief of Police
911 ~~orth 7th Avenue • P.C). Box 2877 • Pocatello, ID 83206-2877 • 208-234-6113 ° Fax (208!-234-629U

w,vw.pocatello.us/polke

Jared Bristol
Melissa Goodwin
3250 Hawthorne Road
Pocatello ID 83201

Dear Mr. Bristol and Ms. Goodwin:
I have reviewed your letter of complaint against our Code Enforcement Division, as well as the
details of the case and the decision of the court. The court made it clear your property was, in
fact, in violation of city ordinances. They also tasked this department with conducting follow-up
on your property, which we have done. There have been no violations by our Code Enforcement
Division, and the case has been well documented and properly handled.
Sincerely,

Scott L. Marchand
Chief of Police
SLM/drm

An Equal Opportunity Employer I Veteran's Preference

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance with all of the
requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served on each party at the
following email address(es):

